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The crowding out of complex social goods 1 
 2 
Abstract 3 
The valuation of ecosystem services to inform natural resource management and development has 4 
gained acceptance in many arenas. Yet, contemporary economic valuation is constrained to the 5 
appraisal of simple goods that generate benefits that accrue to individuals, neglecting complex goods 6 
that generate benefits that accrue to society more broadly. Methodological barriers to the valuation 7 
of complex social goods have led to their frequent omission from natural resource management 8 
deliberations. The prevailing valuation paradigm that focuses on simple individual goods may erode 9 
conservation efforts by crowding out the institutions and behaviours that support socially 10 
constructed ecosystem service values. Erosion of these values ultimately harms the environment 11 
and society as a whole. The institutionalisation of appropriate methods for estimating the value of 12 
complex social goods alongside existing methods for valuing simple individual goods within 13 
international conservation, development and policy-making discourses, is therefore an important 14 
evolution for sustainable natural resource management. 15 
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1 Introduction 21 
Natural resource management and development have long been informed by the economic 22 
valuation of various interrelated ecosystem services and over the past two centuries, these valuation 23 
methods have matured significantly. Putting a ‘price’ on nature allows decision makers to quantify 24 
and elucidate the myriad impacts of development. Efforts to “mainstream the values of biodiversity 25 
and ecosystem services into decision-making at all levels” are broadly recognized; non-market 26 
valuation is now firmly established in international policy discourses concerning natural resource use 27 
and conservation and is actively encouraged by state agencies through the publication of guidelines 28 
and handbooks (for example, Commonwealth of Australia, 2006; H.M. Treasury, 2003). There is, 29 
however, growing recognition that dominant valuation approaches make only a subset of benefits 30 
visible (Kenter et al., 2015) and that by focusing entirely on ‘the market’ and on market incentives, 31 
we may undermine the motivations and thus behaviors we seek to promote (Gneezy et al., 2011).  32 
An emerging body of literature now recognizes a spectrum of value typologies (Vatn, 2009; 33 
Schwartz, 2015; Kenter et al., 2015). These typologies vary in complexity, but highlight that (at the 34 
simplest level), goods may be thought of as having (at least) two distinct dimensions—depicted as 35 
axes in Figure 1. Along the horizontal axis, goods range from simple, with separable benefits (e.g., 36 
food), to complex, with multiple, inter-related and inseparable benefits (e.g., wedding banquet). 37 
Along the vertical axis, benefits derived from goods range from individually constructed, reflecting 38 
individual motivations and ‘utility’ (e.g., ambition and success, respectively), to socially constructed, 39 
representing communal norms, relations, and expectations (e.g., social cohesion).  40 
The various possible combinations of goods and benefits may be illustrated by different types of 41 
fisheries (Panel A, Figure 1), described in Table 1. As discussed in section 2 economists’ ability to 42 
estimate values along these axes is variable. Hence, a limited range of goods has been assessed, with 43 
significant policy implications (discussed in section 3). 44 
 45 
 46 
Figure 1: Panel A: Various ecosystem services and their associated benefits may be visualised in two dimensions. 47 
Along one axis, goods range from simple to complex, illustrated here using different types of fisheries. Along the 48 
other, benefits range from individual to social constructs. Individually constructed benefits reflect individual 49 
‘utility.’ Socially constructed benefits relate to social norms, relations, and expectations. Panel B: Established 50 
methodology sheds light on values relating to simple-individual goods (such as commercial fisheries) with other 51 
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types of goods left mostly in the dark (e.g. recreational fisheries, subsistence fisheries, and in particular, traditional 52 
fisheries). 53 
Table 1: Simplified typology of goods and benefits (derived from insights provided by Vatn 2009; 54 
Schwartz, 2015; Kenter et al. 2015) 55 
  Type of good 
  Simple Complex 
Type of 
Benefit 
Individual Commercial fisheries are an example of a simple 
good bearing individually constructed benefits. 
Although the identify of commercial fishers is often 
tied to their occupation (highlighting the 
importance of cultural values to these fishers), the 
primary motivation for commercial fishing 
(particularly incorporated companies) tends to be 
economic. The benefits associated with this industry 
(e.g., contribution to GDP) are the sum outcome of 
individual motivations and incentives to procure 
income. 
Recreational fishing is an example of a 
complex good that bears individually 
constructed benefits. Recreational fishing 
makes a contribution to individual utility – 
although the contribution comprises 
complex and intertwined 
cultural/recreational and economic benefits. 
Social Small-scale fisheries exemplify simple goods bearing 
socially constructed benefits. They often provide an 
economic safety net for vulnerable members of a 
community. Such fisheries tend to feature strong 
norms of fair access (Hicks et al., 2014), reciprocity 
and taboos concerning trade-offs that promote the 
fair distribution of benefits (Daw et al., 2015). In 
many fisheries along the coast of the western Indian 
Ocean, catch is distributed amongst a range of 
stakeholders, including fishers, traders and small-
scale processors. When the take is plentiful, this 
arrangement is predominantly financial. However, 
when catches are low, the most vulnerable in 
society (often widowed women) are assured 
subsistence without financial exchange (Hicks et al., 
2014; Daw et al., 2015). 
Traditional Indigenous fisheries are complex 
goods bearing socially constructed benefits. 
While the basic acts of hunting and fishing 
may generate simple, individual benefits like 
nutrition and income, the relations and 
meanings formed through these practices’ 
associated norms, traditions, stories, and 
ceremonies bear socio-cultural benefits 
which are often more significant than the 
individual benefits ( Delisle, 2013; Watkin Lui 
et al., 2016). 
 56 
 57 
2 A very brief history of non-market valuation 58 
Although contemporary discourse about the ‘value’ of environmental goods and services is 59 
dominated by the concept of price (exchange value), this does not mean that economists believe 60 
price reflects value; rather, non-market valuation methods are firmly grounded in the broader idea 61 
of utilitarianism—i.e., value is a matter of usefulness (ideas largely attributable to Mill and Marshall). 62 
For most economists, the term utility represents the satisfaction that people gain from the use (or 63 
non-use) of a good or service; economists are thus concerned about people’s satisfaction. For 64 
economists, maximizing someone’s utility thus implies making that person as satisfied as possible. 65 
Many welfare and environmental economists have generalized this notion of utility to the level of 66 
society, whereby ‘social utility’ may be thought of as a measure of social welfare.  67 
Environmental economists often seek to highlight the contribution that environmental goods and 68 
services make to individual or social welfare (utility/wellbeing) and have developed numerous 69 
methods of doing so. Below, we provide a brief (and non-definitive) summary of key events relevant 70 
to the development of these methods and of Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), an institutionalised 71 
framework for weighing up a variety of market and non-market costs and benefits (see Hanley and 72 
Spash, 1993, for a more comprehensive overview). We use Figure 2 to depict key contributing 73 
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economists, concepts and policies chronologically, providing a notional measure of the growth in our 74 
‘knowledge’ of values and valuation methods with a yellow line (with undefined units of ‘knowledge’ 75 
measured on the vertical axis).  76 
 Late 1800s/early 1900s. Mill and Marshall clarify the distinction between value and price, with 77 
the notion of utility—linked to the idea of individual, and potentially also social ‘welfare’ (or 78 
wellbeing) 79 
 Early 1900s. Economists and social scientists collaborate frequently on research into individual 80 
and collective wellbeing (utility/welfare). 81 
 1930’s. Influential economists—namely, Irving Fisher and Vilfredo Pareto—successfully argue 82 
that utility cannot be measured in a way that facilitates meaningful interpersonal comparisons 83 
(Kristoffersen, 2010). From this point, for almost a century, economists and social scientists 84 
largely pursue different research agendas relating to wellbeing/utility/welfare. 85 
 The US Flood Control Act of 1936 (The Act). This act legislated construction of an unprecedented 86 
litany of civil infrastructure works and obligated the government to undertake flood control 87 
efforts in the interest of the “general welfare,” so long as a development project’s “benefits to 88 
whomever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs” (US Congress, 1936, p. 1570). 89 
The Act established a concrete policy imperative for research into the social costs and benefits of 90 
natural resource development. Critically, the Act established that the improvement of social 91 
welfare necessarily required one to account for a diverse range of potentially competing 92 
interests, but it did not specify how this was to be done.  93 
 Late 1930s. Hicks (1939) demonstrated that the welfare gains or losses arising from the addition 94 
or removal of goods and services can be articulated in terms of ‘income-equivalent’ 95 
compensations. That is, the cost (or benefit) to an individual of the loss (or gain) in their access 96 
to a good can be calculated by determining how much remuneration would be required to 97 
compensate them for that loss (formally, to keep their utility constant).  98 
 Late 1930s—early 2000s  99 
 The Total Economic Value (TEV) framework slowly developed, helping to clarify ways in 100 
which people benefit from the environment. Simplistically, the contemporary version of 101 
the framework identifies three broad categories: ‘direct use values’, where people 102 
benefit from the direct use of environmental goods and services (e.g., agriculture); 103 
‘indirect use values’, where people benefit indirectly from the environment (e.g., from 104 
soil substrate water filtration—see Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1955, for an early discussion of 105 
these benefits); and ‘non-use values’, where people benefit from the environment 106 
without using it—as for existence values (e.g., knowing the environment is there) and 107 
bequest values (e.g., leaving the environment intact for future generations) (Krutilla, 108 
1967); and option values (e.g., maintaining the environment for potential future use) 109 
(Weisbrod, 1964).  110 
 Numerous methods for estimating the ‘income-equivalent’ compensations (interpreted 111 
as ‘value’) of the different types of use and non-use values were developed (see 112 
Appendix A for an overview). Some methods are only capable of estimating some values 113 
(e.g., the travel cost method can estimate recreational use-values, but cannot estimate 114 
bequest values). Each method thus generates subtly distinct information (e.g., 115 
expenditure, consumer surplus, willingness to pay) about different types of values. All 116 
methods are conditioned on assumptions, but two key assumptions dominate: first, that 117 
the constituents of utility are distinct, separable and additive (across goods and across 118 
people); and second, that income-equivalent compensations are an appropriate framing 119 
of economic trade-offs.  120 
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 Most research concerning decision-making for improved social welfare was based on 121 
two compelling and related principles, inextricably linked to CBA. First, was the idea of a 122 
Pareto Improvement. Pareto argued that one could unambiguously improve social 123 
welfare if the welfare of at least one person increased, without negatively impacting the 124 
welfare of another. Second, was the notion of a Potential Pareto Improvement (with the 125 
related Kaldor-Hicks test, developed by Hicks and Kaldor (Broadway, 1974). It was noted 126 
that if the benefits of a project outweighed its costs, then the project could potentially 127 
improve social welfare since those who benefited would have more than enough to 128 
compensate those who lost.  129 
 Early 21st century. The 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment ignited broad interest in the 130 
contribution that ecosystem services make to human wellbeing. This further highlighted the 131 
need for policy makers to consider the ‘value’ of the environment more broadly, and thus 132 
increased interest in non-market valuation methods. It also served to focus attention on 133 
wellbeing, rather than exclusively on income-compensations or ‘price’. Arguably, this new focus 134 
helped highlight wellbeing research undertaken by social scientists (with entire journals, e.g., 135 
Social Indicators Research, Journal of Happiness Studies, devoted to the topic). 136 
 Recent decades. An increasingly vocal group of behavioural economists have argued that 137 
individual welfare (i.e., utility) may in fact be cardinal (Barberis, 2013), leading to the emergence 138 
of a new approach to valuation: the life-satisfaction (LS) approach (see, for example, Frey et al., 139 
2009). Simplistically, this approach uses self-reported measures of (individual) well-being as 140 
proxies for utility (Gowdy, 2005) and regresses these measures against factors known to 141 
influence it (including environmental goods and services). LS thus enabled researchers to assess 142 
these ecosystem services’ marginal value (to utility) directly, without needing to assess values as 143 
income-equivalent compensations (though that can also be done). 144 
 145 
Figure 2: Hypothesised growth in our understanding of the ‘value’ of environmental goods and services over time 146 
(shown with a yellow line; notionally measured, without units, on vertical axis). Overlays, include the names and 147 
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life-spans of (a subset of) key researchers (top), key concepts (middle – yellow font) and key 148 
policies/investigations (below axis) which contributed to the development of non-market valuation methods and 149 
methods for weighing up diverse market and non-market values (notably, CBA). Dark shades in upper diagram 150 
indicate values still poorly understood and thus ‘in the dark’. 151 
The US Flood Control Act of 1936 and subsequent institutionalisation of Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) 152 
thus drove significant advancements in the sub-fields of welfare and environmental economics 153 
resulting in the identification of different types of goods and services, and the development of 154 
numerous related non-market valuation methods (Appendix A). The historical development of these 155 
methods means that most contemporary valuation exercises—and associated decision-making 156 
frameworks for aggregating the impacts of development, such as CBA—assume (even if only 157 
implicitly) that: (a) changes in social welfare may be assessed simply as the sum of each person’s 158 
costs and benefits (conceptually, changes in their utility); (b) each person’s utility depends on the 159 
utility they gain from each good and service they select; and (c) social welfare (utility) is the sum of 160 
individuals’ utility.  161 
The emphasis on ostensibly separable components of utility, measured at the individual level 162 
(individual good; individual person) and aggregated to the scale of society has narrowed the focus of 163 
(most) economic valuation exercises to a limited range of simple (separable) goods and services 164 
(Kenter et al., 2015). Techniques for estimating the value of simple individual goods (such as 165 
commercial fisheries, see Figure 1) are well established (assessing, for example, the value of output, 166 
of ‘rent’, see Appendix A). Though it can be difficult to estimate the value of complex individual 167 
goods (like recreational fishing, Figure 1) (Turner et al., 2003), methods and examples exist (see 168 
Appendix A for valuation techniques based on indirect market associations—e.g., travel cost 169 
method, hedonic pricing). Developments within the fields of behavioural and institutional economics 170 
have allowed promising innovations, particularly with regards to the conceptual inclusion of complex 171 
goods (Barberis, 2013), and the LS approach to valuation allows one to consider multiple values 172 
simultaneously. But the underpinning individualism of these approaches necessarily constrains 173 
common valuation exercises to the assessment of goods and services that generate ‘utility’ for 174 
individuals.  175 
Thus, since the period immediately following the Act, when our knowledge about the value of non-176 
market goods (and methods for assessing their value) grew rapidly, the rate of knowledge-growth 177 
has slowed (Figure 2). After passage of the Act, considerable research focused on developing 178 
neoclassical methods (which assumed utility to be measurable only in ordinal terms) to assess 179 
previously understood and newly identified use and non-use values. But since the late 1900s, 180 
attention has, arguably, been focused most ardently on the refinement of existing methods (e.g., on 181 
the development of more sophisticated econometric techniques for analysing data, on incorporation 182 
of insights from psychology into choice-modelling experiments). The development of LS comprises a 183 
notable exception. Although the difficulties of using existing methods to ascribe monetary value to 184 
complex social goods like Traditional Indigenous fishing and hunting (Figure 1) are widely 185 
acknowledged (Altman & Whitehead, 2003; Vent and Quiggin, 2007), relatively little attention has 186 
been given to the development of new methods capable of doing so. Since the early 1900s, research 187 
has thus shed much light on the ‘value’ of individual goods (particularly simple ones) but, in 188 
comparison, we are still very much in the dark when it comes to understanding the ‘value’ of 189 
complex social goods (Panel B, Figure 1). 190 
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3  The crowding out of social values, institutions and norms 191 
“Motivational crowding” has already been shown to occur as a result of economic interventions 192 
(Gneezy et al., 2011; Agrawal et al., 2015). Significantly, the prevailing valuation paradigm that 193 
focuses on individual goods may also contribute to the erosion of conservation efforts and thus 194 
degradation of the environment by crowding out the values, institutions and norms (akin to 195 
motivations) that support socially constructed ecosystem service values.  196 
Every social context can be understood as an institution, in that there are rules and norms that signal 197 
appropriate behaviour (Vatn, 2009). Different social contexts support particular rationalities and 198 
emphasize distinct value types. We reason differently as economic actors in the market, for 199 
example, than we do amongst family and friends. Thus certain institutions support simple individual 200 
goods (e.g., food items) whereas others support complex social goods (e.g., a wedding feast), and 201 
each influences how people behave. An economic valuation exercise is no different in that it imposes 202 
a set of rules and norms concerning how decisions are to be made (Jacobs, 1997). These rules flow 203 
from the valuation method and dictate what is to be investigated and is thus of value, and 204 
characterize the goods and benefits (i.e., as simple, complex, individually or socially constructed) 205 
(Vatn, 2009). The valuation exercise engages these elements according to its self-delineated 206 
analytical framework, ascribing importance to various factors in accordance with prevailing 207 
assumptions, conventions and priorities. When conducting a valuation exercise, we are thus 208 
imposing an institution—with associated assumptions—that prioritises values at the individual level. 209 
Ostrom (1990) and Ostrom et al. (1999) clearly demonstrate that common pool resources are not 210 
necessarily doomed to the tragedy of the commons, and that alternative systems and institutions—211 
especially those that draw upon multiple forms of social capital—are adept to deal with complex 212 
natural resource management problems. Yet the institutionalisation of CBA and the valuation 213 
exercises that support it serves to inadvertently undermine these other frameworks, norms, 214 
behaviours and bodies of knowledge.  215 
Figure 3 depicts the mechanism by which this happens and the impact it has on individual and social 216 
wellbeing. Discussed above, the prevailing paradigm (i.e., CBA) emphasises individual utility over 217 
broader notions of social value (Figure 3, a). Illustrated below, the institutionalisation of valuation 218 
methodologies that prioritise the individual serves to crowd-out social goods (Figure 3, b) and 219 
socially constructed corporate and political decision-making processes (Figure 3, c). This crowding-220 
out undermines social norms and behaviours that impact the environment (Figure 3, d). Discussed in 221 
Section 4, the marginalisation of socially constructed institutions and subsequent degradation of the 222 





Figure 3: The crowding out of social goods, institutions and norms that support the environment and community 226 
wellbeing. CBA and associated non-market valuation techniques (a) prioritize individualistic notions of human 227 
wellbeing over other social constructs thus crowding out: (b) complex social goods and services; (c) socially 228 
constructed decision-making frameworks; and (c) social norms associated with stewardship behaviours. These 229 
socially constructed values, institutions and norms directly support community wellbeing; they also support the 230 
environment, so efforts to protect nature using methods that adopt exclusively individualistic perspectives which 231 
crowd-out social perspectives will not unambiguously improve social welfare (community wellbeing)  232 
 233 
In contrast to simple individual goods, complex social goods (such as those associated with 234 
Indigenous Protected areas that generate multiple simultaneous cultural and provisioning benefits, 235 
amongst others) are typically only discussed in qualitative terms or obscured altogether (Figure 4, 236 
supported by supplementary e-materials). Economic logic suggests that, ceteris paribus, spending 237 
should be directed to programs with the greatest benefit per dollar spent. If, due to their complexity 238 
or because we lack methods for assessing them, entire classes of benefits are routinely omitted from 239 
deliberations, spending will invariably be directed towards interventions and projects that generate 240 
more easily monetized benefits (i.e., towards simple individual goods), rather than to projects that 241 
generate the greatest benefit, per se (at least some of which are likely to be associated with complex 242 
social goods). Our success in validating the value of simple individual goods may have unintentionally 243 
stifled our consideration of complex social goods and services that generate significant social and 244 
environmental benefits (Figure 1)—and may indeed crowd them out (Figure 3, b) by reducing 245 





Figure 4: Studies referring to the ‘value’ of various benefits associated with protected areas in (a) general (N=139) 249 
and (b) specifically Indigenous contexts (N=82), by general methodological approach. We undertook a non-250 
exhaustive search of studies of protected areas (see supplementary e-materials for list of publications included) 251 
classifying them by type of ecosystem service considered (provisioning, regulation and maintenance (R&M), and 252 
cultural). The categories of Health and Employment & Enabling (E&E) were added to capture other benefits 253 
associated with protected areas that are not always mediated through the environment. If studies considered more 254 
than one type of benefit (frequently complex social goods), all are listed. 255 
Society accepts—explicitly and implicitly—that there are different classes of values and that certain 256 
trade-offs should be avoided (Vatn, 2009). Even if not explicitly asking about ‘willingness to pay’, 257 
most contemporary valuation methods assume that an ecosystem service may be ascribed a 258 
marginal value according to a beneficiaries’ willingness to forgo its benefit in exchange for monetary 259 
recompense (Hick’s compensating income). This framing contrives the price at which an otherwise 260 
socially unacceptable trade-off may be sanctioned. By assuming the additively separable nature of 261 
the benefit itself, the exercise also implies that an individual may forgo receipt of a benefit without 262 
reducing the value of the ecosystem service that underlies it. Yet a socially constructed benefit—the 263 
cultural significance of the undeveloped natural environment to its Indigenous traditional owners, 264 
for example—cannot, by definition, be divided into constituent partial values. The socially 265 
constructed value of an ecosystem service is inextricably linked to the communal experience of its 266 
benefit; to erode one’s personal benefit is to erode the benefits of all. The neo-classical estimation 267 
of hypothetically disaggregated values posits trade-offs predicated on individualized incentives. This 268 
belies the true nature of the social good and trivializes difficult decisions regarding the best course of 269 
action for society as a whole. At what price should an individual forgo one’s culture, religion or social 270 
identity? By attempting to commodify complex social goods, the valuation exercise compromises 271 
their values (Adamowicz et al., 1998) (Figure 3. b).  272 
Moreover, most valuation methods generate estimates by assuming that social welfare (or the total 273 
value of a good, or the net social benefit of a project) is the sum of individual welfares (or values, or 274 
net benefits). The simple aggregation of individual estimates of ‘value’ may be inappropriate in some 275 
contexts, particularly when values are held at the community-level (Adamowicz et al., 1998). There is 276 
widespread agreement that benefits associated with the environment are frequently inter-277 
dependent (i.e., ‘complex’); researchers who aggregate partial estimates purportedly risk double-278 
counting ‘overlapping values’ (Hein et al., 2006). Yet this framing implicitly precludes the possibility 279 
that inter-dependent values may be synergistic—that the whole may comprise more than the sum of 280 
its parts. As the value of a shoe is critically diminished in the absence of its partner, so too may 281 
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shared social values be fundamentally complementary. Indigenous peoples, for example, often 282 
accumulate knowledge and wealth at the community-level—particularly values associated with 283 
cultural integrity and continuity (Chan et al., 2012). This is another way by which the use of 284 
individualistic valuation approaches for social goods (complex or otherwise) may serve to undermine 285 
social values (Figure 3. b). 286 
Critically, the omission of complex social goods in valuation exercises may also have unintended 287 
implications on existing values and behaviours. The institutionalisation of CBA has crowded out 288 
alternative systems and institutions capable of dealing with complex natural resource management 289 
(Ostrom, 1999, 2010) (Figure 3, c) and the framing of environmental issues in monetary terms may 290 
weaken intrinsic values and social norms crucial to the promotion of the public good (Gneezy et al. 291 
2011). The financial incentivisation of environmental stewardship, for example, has been shown to 292 
undermine supporting motivations and behaviours (Agrawal et al., 2015), and to increase the costs 293 
of natural resource management and community change processes (Larson and Brake, 2011). This 294 
may marginalise social norms and behaviours imperative to environmental protection (Figure 3, d). 295 
 296 
4 Potential impacts on wellbeing 297 
CBA and the individualistic valuation methods that support it contribute to the crowding out of 298 
social goods, institutions and norms that support the environment. They may thus have the 299 
unintended consequence of indirectly contributing to environmental degradation. Whether or not 300 
that degradation associated with the loss of social goods, institutions and norms outweighs the 301 
(individualistic) positive impacts that CBA and valuation may have upon the environment remains an 302 
empirical question.  303 
But there are other ways in which individual and social wellbeing may be affected. First, the 304 
crowding out of social decision making frameworks has been shown to erode social capital, and this 305 
has a direct negative impact on individual welfare (Achor, 2011), and may also bear environmental 306 
consequences, known to be related to wellbeing. Second, the non-market valuation techniques that 307 
support CBA (and other less structured decision making processes) are essentially voting systems 308 
weighted by personal wealth (Loomis, 2011). This is because willingness to pay (or amount actually 309 
paid) is, amongst other things, a function of ability to pay. Decision processes that use estimates 310 
generated from these methods may thus inadvertently privilege the (net) benefits of the wealthy 311 
above those of the poor. While weights which correct for income differences are sometimes used 312 
within CBA—particularly in developing economies where income inequality is often extreme (Hanley 313 
and Barbier, 2009)—such practices are rare. Such practices are also rare in less structured decision 314 
making environments. The TEEB initiative (van der Ploeg and de Groot, 2010), for example, reports 315 
only the nominal value of various ecosystem services throughout the world, irrespective of sample 316 
income distributions (though TEEB does group countries by relative overall income for comparison). 317 
There is substantial empirical evidence linking individuals’ environmental preferences with their 318 
income (Jacobsen and Hanley, 2009; Hicks et al., 2014) and evidence to suggest that in some 319 
contexts, the wealthy have more to gain from developments that erode the environment than the 320 
poor (Stoeckl et al., 2013). Natural resource management decisions informed by the naïve 321 
application of unweighted ‘values’ may thus be more inclined to approve projects that degrade the 322 
environment than other decision making processes while simultaneously exacerbating the growing 323 
global inequality of the past several decades (Jaumotte et al., 2013). 324 
Third, inequality has been shown to impact individual and community wellbeing (Wilkinson, 1996, 325 
Wilkinson and Picket, 2010; Guy and McCandless, 2012). There are established methods for 326 
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incorporating variables that account for equity (e.g., the distribution of income) within social welfare 327 
functions (SEN – REFS), but by design and intent, most valuation methods ignore distributional 328 
issues. In CBA, it is generally assumed that a net social benefit represents a potential Pareto 329 
improvement—with net social benefit represented as the sum of individually constructed benefits. It 330 
has been shown that raising the income (rewards) of one individual without lowering the income 331 
(rewards) of another can generate significant discord of individuals who do not receive the higher 332 
income (reward) (Brosnan and De Waal, 2003). Unless monetary estimates of the ‘costs’ of social 333 
discord and ‘benefits’ related to equality are included in CBAs, one cannot assume that the 334 
measured net benefits represent a genuine Pareto improvement (since certain costs and benefits 335 
have been omitted from the assessment).  336 
 337 
5 Conclusion 338 
The social estimation of value has been long unbound from the concept of ‘price’ that characterised 339 
economics until the mid-19th century. A dawning recognition of the non-market value of ecosystem 340 
services, bolstered by Hick’s notion of compensating income, has inspired the burgeoning field of 341 
environmental economics and critically enhanced sustainable management of natural resources. 342 
Passage of the Flood Control Act further rooted the assessment of environmental values within 343 
mainstream natural resource management policy. Subsequent development of the TEV helped to 344 
elucidate many of the natural environment’s non-use values, including recreational, cultural, non-345 
use, bequest and existence values. In turn, society’s expanding comprehension of our innate inter-346 
connectedness with the environment has been complemented and further strengthened by the 347 
development of novel economic tools for assessing different types of use and non-use values, 348 
including, among others, travel cost (for recreational use-values), contingent valuation and 349 
contingent behaviour methods (arguably developed to assess non-use values, but also capable of 350 
assessing use-values). 351 
As a conservation initiative, estimating the value of ecosystem services has done much to illuminate 352 
the benefits individuals derive from nature. But the emphasis on goods that generate individual 353 
benefits may serve to erode the values, institutions and norms that enhance and protect the 354 
environment, individual and community wellbeing. Whilst valuation practitioners have within their 355 
‘tool kit’ a diverse array of models for estimating nature’s contribution to individual utility, methods 356 
for highlighting the socially defined values of complex goods are relatively less well developed, and 357 
less politically accepted. So too are socially constructed methods for making decisions related to the 358 
environment. To continue to obscure these values within the public discourse, and (in the US) to rely 359 
upon CBA as the ‘preferred’ mechanism for assessing change, risks further erosion of the norms and 360 
behaviours upon which effective natural resource management depends. Additional research is 361 
therefore needed to improve our methods of enumerating the value of complex goods and for 362 
assessing the desirability of changes that may impact them.  363 
Ostrom (1990) highlights the numerous examples of situations where non-individualistic approaches 364 
(such as those requiring private property) have successfully managed natural resources; evidently 365 
communal approaches can be successful. In Indigenous communities, some people retain dynamic 366 
traditional knowledge, practices and beliefs, evolved over thousands of years, transmitted from one 367 
generation to the next (Berkes, 2008). The authority to speak about (or to ‘value’) particular goods 368 
or services is often vested solely in community Elders (Venn and Quiggin, 2007). In these 369 
communities, it may thus be more appropriate to assess complex social values through community-370 
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driven group and deliberative approaches (Wilson and Howarth, 2002), than using the non-market 371 
valuation approaches so commonly applied in other settings. As is true for neo-classical non-market 372 
valuation approaches, no single approach is problem free, but we must give them more attention, 373 
identifying, for example, the contexts in which these other approaches are most/least appropriate.  374 
To conclude, we note that CBA does not ask, “What is right for society as a whole?” but rather, 375 
“What would generate the greatest (net) benefit for individuals within society?” To focus exclusively 376 
on what generates the greatest net benefit for individuals risks a crowding-out of social goods, 377 
institutions and norms that support the environment and individual and community wellbeing. The 378 
importance of these social constructs calls upon us to consider principles of public interest, not just 379 
principals of private/individual gain or loss. The challenge, of course, is to work out what those 380 
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APPENDIX A: Overview of traditional (neoclassical) non-market valuation techniques 
General approach Specific examples Comments 
Valuation techniques that use market prices: 
Market prices exist only for goods which are bought and sold. So 
these techniques are only able to provide information about 
‘use-values’ which are traded in the market and cannot quantify 
many of the non-use values associated with the environment 
such as cultural, existence and bequest values. 
Change in the value of 
output (increase or 
decreases in earning) 
This technique simply estimates the extra earnings (or losses) associated with 
an environmental good or service (e.g., comparing farm production on soils 
with varying biodiversity to draw inferences about the value of biodiverse soil 




This technique looks at how much people spend to prevent damages from 
occurring to draw inferences about the ‘value’ of an ecosystem service that 
does the same job (e.g., by estimating how much would be spent on 
constructing sea walls to prevent beach erosion and storm damage, one can 
estimate the ‘value’ of fringing coral reefs or mangroves which provide similar 
protection (Burke et al, 2008)) 
Replacement cost or 
Expected cost 
These approaches look at how much it does (or is expected to) cost to replace 
damaged items (e.g., the cost of repairing buildings and businesses after 
storm surge provides an estimate of the (regulating) value of wetlands which 
reduce storm surge damage - Barbier, 1994, 2007). 
Valuation techniques that use surrogate markets: 
Revealed preference approaches do not require the goods that 
one wishes to ‘value’ to be exchanged in the market, but they 
require a strong connection between that good and the market 
(e.g., house prices and ‘views’; salaries/wages and workplace 
safety). 
 
If one cannot establish a connection between the intangible 
good to be valued and the market then one cannot use these 
techniques. This is most likely to be the case for intangible 
benefits associated with IPAs such as spiritual/cultural, bequest 




property or land value 
approaches) 
This technique assumes that multiple things contribute to the ‘value’ of a 
house (or car, or job) – some of which are associated with the environment. 
Essentially, it is as if it compares the value of two houses which are identical in 
all respects (e.g., number of bedrooms, bathrooms) except for one: proximity 
to an urban park. The difference in house price between that which is near the 
park and that which is not, gives an indication of the ‘value’ of the park 
(Czembrowski and Kronenberg, 2016). 
Travel cost This technique notes that even if entry to a park is ‘free’, people must spend 
money travelling to and from it. The money spent travelling can be used to 
draw inferences about the value of a park, an activity related to the park 
(Prayaga et al., 2010), or the value of parks that are of different environmental 
‘quality’ (e.g., people will travel further and spend more to visit a well 
maintained park than a degraded one).  
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General approach Specific examples Comments 
used to monetise those benefits. Acceptance of 
compensation 
This technique considers how much people have been awarded, in the courts, 
as ‘compensation’ for damages – using those estimates as a proxy for ‘value’ 
(Kallis et al., 2013). 
Stated preference techniques:  
In principal, these techniques are capable of estimating the 
monetary ‘value’ of anything, including use and non-use values. 
People are asked how much they would be ‘willing to pay’ if a 
market did exist. The quality of the estimate is only as good as 
the quality of the experiment designed to elicit the ‘value’ – and 
there is a substantive body of literature that provides guidance 
on how best to describe the market and conduct the experiment. 
These techniques thus require the use of complex survey design, 
often draining to the respondents and requiring the use of 
sophisticated analytical procedures (Bateman et al., 2002; Day et 
al., 2012).  
Contingent valuation Contingent Valuation (CV) involves the construction of ‘hypothetical’ markets. 
Individuals are asked to indicate their WTP to, for example, increase water 
quality/clarity to enjoy swimming, snorkelling or diving (Awatere, 2008). 
Choice Modelling Choice modelling (CM) differs from CV, in that respondents are asked to 
choose between alternatives, rather than asked if they are willing to pay a 
price. CM involves the construction of numerous different ‘choice-sets’, each 
with different characteristics (e.g., differently levels of environmental 
amenity) and different prices. Individuals are asked to indicate which choice-
set is preferred, and these preferences are used to draw inferences about the 
value of the different characteristics described in the choice-sets (Kerr and 
Swaffield, 2012; Kragt et al., 2007; Rolfe and Windle, 2003).  
NB: Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) and assessments of the Social Return on Investment (SROI) are occasionally referred to as non-market valuation methods. However, they 
are not, strictly speaking, non-market ‘valuation’ methods. Rather they are structured ways of aggregating monetised data about benefits and costs – weighting them 
against each other according to specific rules (e.g. including discount rates). In theory, a comprehensive CBA or SROI analysis includes monetised estimates of all benefits 
and all costs associated with the project/program being evaluated. Since many benefits and costs are not directly associated with the market, both CBA and SROI require 
researchers to undertake non-market valuation exercises (using techniques like those listed in the table above) to generate estimates of costs and benefits, for use in the 
wider analysis. See: Costa 2013 for further details on SROI. See Baker and Ruting 2014 for CBA. 
